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ABSTRACT 
This article will scrutinize the approaches of Janet Martin Soskice and Gavin 
D’Costa to the Trinity, embodiment and gender. It argues that the doctrine 
of the Trinity is closely connected with embodiment, and assesses Soskice’s 
and D’Costa’s answers to gender-related questions that have arisen from the 
connection between embodiment and the Trinity. The aim of the article is 
firstly to prove that orthodox interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity 
are not essentially exclusive to women, and secondly that the Trinitarian ap-
proach provides an intriguing model by which to understand sexual differ-
ence at the human level. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Trinity, incarnation, embodiment, gender, feminist theology, difference, sex-
ual difference, relational subjectivity  
 
INTRODUCTION 
What do embodiment and the Trinity have to do with each other? The 
doctrine of the Trinity is often seen as the most abstract doctrine in Christian 
dogma, a doctrine that transcends not only our physical reality but our ra-
tionality as well. In the present article, however, I shall argue that the doc-
trine of the Trinity is closely connected with embodiment, by drawing on the 
work of Janet Martin Soskice, Professor of Philosophical Theology at the Uni-
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versity of Cambridge and fellow of Jesus College, and Gavin D’Costa, Profes-
sor of Catholic Theology at the University of Bristol. Furthermore, I shall as-
sess their answers to gender-related questions that have arisen as a result of 
connecting the Trinity with embodiment. 
 Common to Soskice and D’Costa is their view that the Trinitarian ap-
proach is essential to contemporary assessments of embodiment in a Chris-
tian context. Soskice emphasizes that the connection between embodiment 
and the Trinity was already very close when the doctrine was first articulated. 
At the time, the need for a specific doctrinal formulation was practical rather 
than theoretical. It arose from the belief in God’s incarnation, i.e. from the 
conviction that God was embodied as an individual person in Jesus Christ, as 
well as from the practical and pastoral questions that the early Church asso-
ciated with this belief. The doctrine of the Trinity was a response to the prob-
lem of how it is possible to simultaneously believe that there is only one God, 
and that Jesus truly is God in a human body. She clarifies the process as fol-
lows: ‘The means, the tools at hand, were those of a Greek philosophy but the 
motives were pastoral and apologetic. The doctrine of the Trinity adds noth-
ing extra to the basic Christian confession.’1 
Although the notion of embodiment had already played an essential 
role from early on, gender-related questions concerning the Trinity and em-
bodiment did not arise until contemporary theology got underway in tandem 
with feminist approaches. Common questions posed by contemporary femin-
ists include the following. ‘If God is embodied as a male, what have women to 
do with him? Are men essentially closer to God and are women excluded from 
divinity due to their gender?’ Or, expressed metaphysically: ‘How is the gen-
dered state of human being as Imago Dei related to God, and what is the rela-
tion between sexual difference at the human level and gender-related imagery 
in religious language?’2 
My aim is to prove firstly that from orthodox interpretations of the 
doctrine of the Trinity it is possible to find answers to these questions that are 
not exclusive to women (or men), and secondly that the Trinitarian approach 
provides an intriguing model by which to understand sexual difference at the 
                                                     
1 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ in: Susan Frank Parsons (ed.), The Cambridge 
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human level. Both Soskice and D’Costa reflect on these questions, striving to 
take the feminist challenge seriously, and to answer them from within the 
Christian, mostly Roman-Catholic, tradition. 
 
 
INCLUSION WITHOUT FEMALE DIVINITY 
The French feminist Luce Irigaray formulates the feminist criticism of the 
Christian concept of the Trinity in terms of exclusive maleness in the follow-
ing way:  
Christianity tells us that God is in three persons, three manifestations, and that 
the third stage of the manifestation occurs as a wedding between the spirit and 
the bride. Is this supposed to inaugurate the divine for, in, with women? The 
female? Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign. No 
human subjectivity, no human society has ever been established without the 
help of the divine… There is no woman God, no female trinity: mother, daugh-
ter, spirit.3 
Irigaray demands that there be a female god and finds a possible candidate in 
the third person of the Trinity, the Spirit. She is not entirely alone here, for in 
early Syriac tradition the Spirit had been styled as feminine, because the 
gender of this noun in Semitic languages is female – ruha’ in Syriac and ruâh 
in Hebrew. However, her motive for feminizing the Spirit is not historical or 
linguistic but rather ideological.4 She suggests that God’s incarnation in Jesus 
Christ should be understood only as a partial incarnation and that the femi-
nine spirit following him had made the incarnation complete. Only in that 
way would the Godhead include feminity and provide possibility of subjectivi-
ty for women.5  
Gavin D’Costa accepts Irigaray’s challenge and offers two compatible 
solutions to the problem she presents. In both, he rejects Irigaray’s demand by 
highlighting that God’s incarnation should not be understood as an exclusion 
of women even though God was incarnated as a man. First, God in fact did not 
only utilize Christ’s male body as the instrument of salvation but the female 
                                                     
3
 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies transl. Gillian C. Gill (New York 1993), 62. 
4
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5
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body of Christ’s mother Mary as well. The physical motherhood of Mary thus 
proves that femininity cannot be contrary to divinity. Secondly, he partly 
agrees with Irigaray’s argument that God’s incarnation as the individual male 
Jesus Christ could be understood as an incomplete incarnation.6 
D’Costa, however, rejects Irigaray’s view that the incarnation was com-
pleted only in the incarnation of a female spirit, because that would assign 
sexual difference within the Trinity. Instead, the incarnation was completed 
only in the life of Jesus’ resurrected body – the Marian church – which is addi-
tionally depicted as the body of Christ and as his bride. This ‘Church-body’ 
has been described as a female body throughout history and will not be com-
plete until the eschaton. Every member – female and male – of the Church, 
the body of Christ, is a part of the salvific act of the Trinity. According to 
D’Costa, as members of Christ’s body, members of the Church are also co-
redeemers with Christ, as is Mary, the first Co-Redeemer. In spite of Irigaray’s 
criticism of this model, women are not excluded, but have their own subjec-
tivity by participating in the Trinitarian life as members of Christ’s body, 
without having, however, a sovereign subjectivity. We shall shortly return to 
the concept of subjectivity later in this article.7 
 D’Costa also criticized Irigaray’s call for feminine divinity, that her 
model would actually essentialize sexual difference in a way that would be 
alien to the Christian understanding of both man and woman being created in 
the image of each person of the Trinity. D’Costa as well as Soskice reject any 
attempt to assign sexual difference to the Trinity. They both emphasize that 
God is beyond human gender-limits, in other words he does not lack gender, 
but surpasses it, and therefore each of the three persons can be described with 
both male and female imagery. Furthermore, they both remark that in the 
previously mentioned Syriac tradition the Spirit was considered to be inferior 
to the Father and Son, and therefore feminine. This view is in contradiction 
with feminist purposes as well as orthodox understandings of the Trinity.8 
 D’Costa asserts that in assigning gender to the divine per se, Christiani-
ty is in danger of idolatry, that is, of univocally assigning qualities from the 
created world to God. He writes: ‘Analogy reminds us that any likeness that 
indeed exists always does so within a greater unlikeness and difference. To 
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forget this is to be idolatrous and anthropomorphic.’9 He suggests that ‘it is in 
the relationship between gendered difference, not in gender itself, that we 
find the analogical bridge to the Trinitarian God.’10  
Even Christians from other – non-Catholic – denominations, like my-
self, may find D’Costa’s points fruitful and worth considering. Although the 
role of Mary and appealing to Marian dogmas may sound alien, his argument 
about being members of Christ’s body is not far removed from the Lutheran 
dogma of common priesthood, for example. However, Lutherans would prob-
ably not talk about co-redeemers, but rather co-workers, or they would not 
say that Christ’s incarnation was incomplete. Yet they could agree with 
D’Costa that men and women are members of the same body, the body of 
Christ and his Church-bride. According to this understanding, sexual differ-
ence does not subvert common humanity but is compatible with it. The work 
of the Holy Spirit in the Church demonstrates the inclusion of both men and 
women in union with God. And this union is performed bodily in the sacra-
ments, in prayer, and in the Church’s proclamation that repeats the unique 
event of incarnation like an echo.  
 Further, Irigaray calls for a female god in order to establish the auton-
omy and subjectivity of women. In other words, she wishes to change some 
divine attributes on account of her feminist purposes. But since God is by de-
finition a necessary being, the prime cause and mover of all existence who 
himself has no cause, would a god whose attributes are defined according to 
certain needs of certain people be God at all, or rather an idol? God has the 
desired influence upon culture, societies and the subjectivity of individuals 
solely as God, as an omnipotent, good, necessary and personal being. By 
changing the reference to the concept, its influence would be changed as well. 
It is not evident that any idol could provide help in establishing the subjectivi-
ty of women. Another question is whether Irigaray’s ideal of subjectivity and 
autonomy is even desirable, but we shall return to this later.  
  
 
HOW TO INTERPRET THE GENDERED LANGUAGE OF THE TRINITY? 
While Gavin D’Costa provided an interpretation of the continuing incar-
nation as an answer to the feminist challenge, Janet Martin Soskice’s response 
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focuses on the interpretations of gendered imagery in Christian language. 
Soskice notes that questions concerning gender and the Trinity are not rele-
vant to feminist theologians who have already cast off the basic elements of 
the Trinitarian doctrine in their thinking. According to her, the Trinity has 
essential significance only for those who have a reasonably high Christology, 
in other words, for those who wish to say ‘Jesus is God incarnate.’11 
To such persons she gives four reasons for adhering to the Trinitarian 
doctrine despite its ostensible masculinism. First she notes that the doctrine 
of the Trinity protects the otherness of God from anthropomorphism. One 
God with three persons is infinitely different from any human being. God is 
not a creature, or a male, although he was incarnated as a man. ‘Father’ and 
‘Son’ are not to be understood strictly in biological terms.12 
Secondly, she sees the doctrine as defeating the main target of the fe-
minist critique: covert monarchianism. The indifferent and distant god criti-
cized by feminist theologians is not the God of Scripture or the Trinity but 
rather the god of deism.13 She argues that the Trinitarian God of Scripture 
creates from love and is present in his creation. The Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity describes the ways in which God is with us all the way to incarnation, 
adopting human flesh and dying on the cross, and present among us in the 
Spirit.14 
Thirdly, the Trinitarian doctrine endorses the fundamental goodness 
and beauty of the human being through the incarnation. Jesus was true man 
and true God, and in him God became a fully and truly sexed human being in 
a real human body.15 But it is precisely this male embodiment of God that is a 
stumbling block for several feminists. However, if it is complicated for them 
to accept that God was incarnated as a man, what would the alternative be? 
What if God had been incarnated as a woman, but every other detail in the 
biblical narrative remained in place? What would change? If God had been 
born as a little girl from the Virgin Mary without any contribution from a 
man, would this alternative not be rather exclusive of men? In that case would 
there not be a good reason for men to complain that they have no role in 
God’s plan? A female god would have been born as a girl with a female body 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 136–137. 
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from a female body, and men would have been completely unnecessary. But 
unlike that narrative, God, according to the Bible, employed both a female 
body and a male body to accomplish his salvific act, not, however, by allocat-
ing each an equal role, not by flattening sexual difference, but rather by con-
firming it. I think that it would be appropriate to ask whether the feminist 
interpretation of the exclusion of women is essentially a failure to recognize 
the significance of physical motherhood. In addition, D’Costa has noted that 
feminists probably would not accept a female incarnation either, because Je-
sus ended up being violated and crucified. A tortured female savior would in-
stead be seen as affirming phallic violence against women rather than pro-
scribing it.16  
The fourth point Soskice makes relates to philosophical questions that 
have been articulated by postmodernists and contemporary feminists. Soskice 
regards the doctrine of the Trinity as challenging the ‘philosophies of One’ 
that constitute the same targets of both feminism and postmodernism. The 
doctrine of the Trinity moves us beyond the binarism of ‘the One’ and ‘the 
other,’ where ‘the other’ is defined only as ‘not me’ and thus only serves the 
establishment of ‘the One.’17 Soskice notes that Trinitarian theology was origi-
nally formulated to counter a similar metaphysics of the One which does not 
allow any genuine otherness but in which the otherness is merely the ‘Other 
of the Same.’ The Trinitarian God is unity in difference and relational in him-
self.18 None of the three persons can be understood as separate or indepen-
dent from the other two. The persons of the Trinity are only in relation to 
each other in a ‘perichoretic outpouring of love.’19 
Earlier in this article Luce Irigaray was quoted as calling for divine help 
in order to establish women’s autonomy and sovereignty. In contrast to her 
view, the doctrine of the Trinity provides a quite different ideal for human 
subjectivity. As Soskice emphasizes, the persons of the Trinity exist only in 
relation to each other, which means that genuine subjectivity is not to be 
found in distant solitude and autonomy but rather in loving relations with 
other subjects. This ideal is quite opposite to the feminist ideal of an indepen-
dent emancipated woman who could paradoxically be seen as a representation 
of the Cartesian ideal of subjectivity. 
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According to Soskice, the doctrine of the Trinity reveals that ‘to-be’ 
most fully is ‘to-be-related’ in difference.20 She refers to Augustine’s De Trini-
tate where the imago Dei is considered to mean that human beings are 
created in the image of the Trinity instead of that of the Son, which is a male 
image. In this way Augustine rejected the implication that women were not 
created fully in the image of God long before feminists set out their questions 
on the same subject.21  
Soskice reminds us that it is not possible to avoid masculine terminolo-
gy in Christianity ‘as long as the New Testament is with us.’22 In contrast to 
the Old Testament, ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ in the New Testament are very central 
divine nominations. Trying to replace the Christian language of ‘God as Fa-
ther’ would result in a new religion.23 
Instead of replacing the language, Soskice is willing to draw attention to 
the reason why a gendered imagery is so crucial in biblical writings as well as 
in the liturgical tradition. She remarks that the gendered imagery found in the 
Bible mainly involves kinship titles like ‘Father’ and ‘Son,’ and concludes that 
the main purpose of the writers was not to emphasize sex but kinship, a close 
and loving relationship between God and human beings.24 Furthermore, the 
way in which gendered nominations are usually applied rules out literal read-
ings of the imagery. As an example, the image of God as a rock giving birth, 
with him being both the Father and the spouse of Israel, are rather effective in 




Will these answers satisfy feminists who have been worried about the 
masculinism of the Trinitarian doctrine? Feminists such as Luce Irigaray who 
wish to find an essential establishment of human sexual difference in the sex-
ual difference that occurs at the divine level will certainly be disappointed. 
The Trinitarian doctrine does not justify assigning sexual difference univocally 
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 Soskice, ‘Trinity and Feminism,’ 142. 
23
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to the Trinity. Instead of that, a feminist could be relieved that the Trinitarian 
doctrine does not describe divinity as one, or three, distant divine men but 
rather as one God in three persons, which transcends human gender defini-
tions. The Trinitarian God is present in his creation, especially as being born 
into this world – in a male body but through a female body. The Trinitarian 
doctrine asserts that both sexes can be employed as instruments of God’s holy 
work and therefore neither of them as embodied beings is alien to God or ex-
cluded from union with him. The most spiritual event of the incarnation was 
at the same time a thoroughly bodily event. In other words, the doctrine of 
the Trinity breaks the boundaries between spiritual and embodied reality. 
Furthermore, I would suggest that the Trinitarian approach provides an 
intriguing model for understanding the concept of difference. The difference 
between the persons of the Trinity is not contrary to their unity but rather a 
force that draws them to each other in reciprocal love, from which the whole 
of creation originates. Although we cannot apply divine reality to human life 
univocally, it can open up for us a potential perspective in which difference is 
not necessarily seen as separating and alienating. Instead, some forms of dif-
ference should rather be understood as being of a connecting nature, and 
therefore good as such.  
However, this view does not claim that all differences function this way. 
Some produce alienation, discrimination and oppression. Perhaps all differ-
ences are capable of engendering these conditions if misinterpreted and mi-
sused, if the goodness or likeness of God is attributed to one part of the differ-
ence and wickedness correspondingly to the other. But if God as a perfectly 
good being contains difference within himself, it follows that human differ-
ences, such as the sexual difference between men and women, can be consi-
dered as essentially good as well, as a part of the richness of divine self-
expression. Sexual difference could be seen as a connecting force, not as dis-
criminating but as binding humankind together through marriage and fami-
lies, and producing new life. In that case rejecting sexual difference in an at-
tempt to resist discrimination and oppression would be a mistake. A more 
fruitful approach would be to strengthen those interpretations of sexual dif-
ference that emphasize both sexes as an imago Dei of the Trinitarian God. 
